Higher education loans and tax evasion: a case of policy eroding compliance? by Ahmed, Eliza
 Higher education loans and tax evasion:
A case of policy eroding compliance?
 
Eliza Ahmed
WORKING PAPER 75 • JUNE 2005
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIGHER EDUCATION LOANS AND TAX EVASION: 
A CASE OF POLICY ERODING COMPLIANCE? 
 
Eliza Ahmed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Tax System Integrity 
Research School of Social Sciences 
Australian National University 
Canberra, ACT, 0200 
 
ISBN 0 642 76875 7 
ISSN 1444-8211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER No 75 
June 2005 
 
 ii
Centre for Tax System Integrity, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University 2005 
 
Commonwealth of Australia 2005 
 
 
 
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication data: 
 
 
Ahmed, Eliza. 
Higher education loans and tax evasion: A case of policy 
eroding compliance. 
  
  
Bibliography. 
ISBN 0 642 76875 7. 
  
1. Higher Education Contribution Scheme (Australia).  
2. Taxation - Australia. 3. Student loan funds - Australia. 
4. Tax evasion - Australia. I. Centre for Tax System 
Integrity. II. Title. (Series: Working paper (Centre for 
Tax System Integrity); no. 75). 
  
  
336.201294 
 
 
 
If you would like to make any comments on this working paper please contact the author 
directly within 90 days of publication. 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
 
This article has been written as part of a series of publications issued from the Centre for 
Tax System Integrity. The views contained in this article are representative of the author 
only. The publishing of this article does not constitute an endorsement of or any other 
expression of opinion by the Australian National University or the Commissioner of 
Taxation of the author’s opinion. The Australian National University and the 
Commissioner of Taxation do not accept any loss, damage or injury howsoever arising that 
may result from this article. This article does not constitute a public or private ruling within 
the meaning of the Taxation Administration Act 1953, nor is it an advance opinion of the 
Commissioner of Taxation. 
 iii
THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
 
 
 
 iv
Abstract 
 
Australian higher education funding policy has been a contentious and emotionally 
charged topic on the political agenda since the introduction of the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS) in 1989. HECS may have been genuinely intended to 
promote access to higher education on the basis of merit rather than socio-economic 
background, but it is now giving rise to negative unintended consequences. Dissatisfaction 
with university courses undermines a sense of obligation to repay HECS debt, which in 
turn impairs tax morale and triggers tax evasion. HECS policy has, therefore, been counter-
productive in practice in building legal compliance despite its rigorous economic 
developments and its intuitive appeal to policy makers. Policy needs to be not only 
economically sound but also emotionally intelligent if government expects to receive 
voluntary compliance from citizens. 
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Higher education loans and tax evasion: A case of policy eroding compliance? 
 
Eliza Ahmed 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Australian higher education funding policy has been a contentious and emotionally 
charged topic on the political agenda since the introduction of the Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS) in 1989. The Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office) has 
the legal responsibility for collecting the balance of the outstanding loan from graduates 
through the taxation system. The question asked in this paper is whether this responsibility 
poses a challenge to the efficient functioning of the Tax Office and, if so, what strategies 
are needed to improve its functioning. In answering this question, issues are raised that 
extend beyond HECS policy. Internationally, tax administrations increasingly are showing 
interest in taking on the role of being a collection agency for superannuation, child support, 
traffic fines and the like (Vehorn & Brondolo, 1999). Analyses of the kind offered here 
should be undertaken to ensure that the legal authority of tax administrations is not being 
slowly undermined by adding such functions to that of collecting tax. 
 
Background of the present study 
 
HECS1 is a higher education loan scheme that enables many Australian students to defer 
paying their tuition fees until they reach the minimum HECS payment income threshold. 
The primary purpose of HECS was to provide merit-based university access to all 
Australians regardless of their socio-economic background. Prior to HECS, Australians 
had enjoyed a period of free tuition for those talented enough to win a place in Australia’s 
largely publicly funded university system. As government started considering a user-pays 
system for those attending university, great concern was expressed about how tuition fees 
would disadvantage talented students from a lower or more marginalised socio-economic 
background. HECS was the government’s answer to these concerns. 
 
                                                           
1 Note that from 2005, HECS is called HECS-HELP (for details, see 
http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/higher_education/policy_issues_reviews/key_issues/AIP_2005/Higher_Educ
ation_Loan_Programme/What _is_HELP.htm) 
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Under HECS, students can choose to pay their contribution upfront or defer it. The 
Commonwealth provides a 25% discount2 to eligible students who pay upfront. Students 
who choose to defer payment take out a loan from the Commonwealth Government and are 
required to repay that loan when their income exceeds the minimum threshold for 
compulsory payment. At the time of this research, the threshold was $21 985 a year. 
 
Since the introduction of HECS, concern has grown about its adverse consequences for 
Australian graduates and the Australian economy. For example, HECS debt has caused 
students to defer other investment decisions (such as family commitments, house purchase, 
and business investments) and to engage in increased paid outside work during semester 
(Larkins, 2003). A recent report has revealed that 20% of HECS loans (estimated to 
amount to A$2.8 billion in 2004) are unlikely to be repaid (The Australian, 13 November 
2004). An even more alarming effect of HECS is diminished morale in relation to HECS 
payment and to paying tax (Braithwaite & Ahmed, in press) and an increase in tax evasion 
(see for example Ahmed & Braithwaite, 2004).  
 
Against this background, it is important to consider the question: Can HECS policy be 
counter-productive, and if so, why? Compliance with tax laws and principles does not 
occur in a social and emotional vacuum, but rather in the context of other legally 
prescribed and socially imposed constraints such as HECS. The micro and the macro 
factors influencing HECS payments seem to be interconnected through the reciprocal 
dynamics between the emotions and motivations of graduates on one hand, and the 
complex characteristics of social and political systems and institutions on the other. Policy 
makers generally have not been interested in these micro factors, and how they affect the 
behaviour of individuals, and eventually the effectiveness of policy. This paper, therefore, 
aims to understand these social-psychological factors and explain how they render HECS 
policy counter-productive from the perspective of those whose job it is to administer tax 
law and collect HECS payments. 
 
 
 
                                                           
2 From 2005, the discount rate for upfront payment is 20%. 
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Structure of empirical analysis 
 
This paper draws together empirical findings from three studies to analyse the question of 
how psychological factors account for the way in which policy in one area (higher 
education funding policy) can affect the behaviour of stakeholders in another area 
(taxpaying). The empirical component of the paper is structured in three sections.  
 
The next section (II) examines whether citizens who carry a HECS debt are more likely to 
cheat on their tax returns than those without such debt. It draws on two independent 
surveys: (a) the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions survey (CHFA; Braithwaite, 2001), 
which was conducted nationwide in Australia, and (b) the Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and 
Actions survey (GHVA; Ahmed, 2000b), which contains data obtained from a sample of 
Australian graduates.  
 
Section III highlights the important differences between graduates with HECS debt and 
those without in relation to their socio-demographic characteristics, their attitudes toward 
their education, HECS policy and the tax system, and finally their taxpaying behaviour. 
For this purpose, data are taken from the GHVA Survey. Section III raises the following 
questions: 
(a) Do graduates carrying a HECS debt experience university courses differently from 
those who pay upfront? 
(b) Are graduates who carry a HECS debt more likely to oppose HECS than those who 
pay upfront?  
(c) Do graduates carrying a HECS debt have a more antagonistic view toward the tax 
system than those who pay upfront? Are they more likely to engage in tax evasion? 
 
The final empirical section investigates the psychological factors underlying tax evasion 
among graduates in the context of HECS policy. Section IV again uses data from the 
GHVA survey. The central questions addressed in this section are: 
(a) To what extent does discontent at a personal and a policy level with higher 
education and its funding undermine tax compliance among graduates? 
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(b) What roles do shame and conscience play in mediating citizens’ discontent (policy 
and personal) and tax evasion? 
 
II. HECS POLICY SPILLS OVER INTO TAX EVASION 
 
Database and methodology 
 
The analyses presented in this section are based on two data sets – the CHFA survey and 
the GHVA survey.  
 
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that the survey methodology that was used lends 
itself to a potential bias in recruiting a sample that was over-representative of compliant 
citizens. In order to encourage the less compliant to participate, a number of steps were 
considered. First, care was taken to be open to different views about HECS and the tax 
system. Sometimes people evade tax for reasons that they are very willing to explain 
(Braithwaite, 2003). Second, it was emphasised that the research was conducted by the 
Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University, and that the Tax 
Office would not have access to any taxpayers’ individual survey responses. It was also 
pointed out that the survey was anonymous and that answers would remain confidential. 
Credible assurances of anonymity and confidentiality are essential to minimising socially 
desirable responses (that is, the tendency to present in a favourable way) in surveys of this 
kind. The two surveys on which the analyses presented in this paper are based are 
described below. 
 
Community Hopes, Fears and Actions (CHFA) survey 
 
The CHFA survey was a national survey conducted between June and December 2000 by 
the Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University. A stratified 
random sample of 7754 persons was selected from the publicly available electoral rolls. A 
lengthy questionnaire on tax matters was sent to each person selected, together with a letter 
explaining the purpose of the study and a stamped addressed envelope for the return of the 
completed questionnaire.  
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Of the households contacted, 29% (after allowing for undelivered questionnaires and 
ineligible respondents) completed and returned the survey after several reminders,3 
providing 2,040 cases for further analysis. This response rate, while low in absolute terms, 
compares favorably with rates reported for other tax surveys (Pope, Fayle, & Chen, 1993; 
Kirchler, 1999; Wallschutzky, 1996; Webley, Adams, & Elffers, 2002). 
  
A series of diagnostic analyses (see Mearns & Braithwaite, 2001) suggested that the 
sample yielded a relatively representative cross-section of the views of Australians about 
their tax system. Furthermore, the sample was relatively representative of the population 
with regard to sex, ethnicity, education, age, occupation, and marital status. Two biases 
were detected: an over-representation of those in scribing occupations who would have 
been more comfortable with a detailed response-intense questionnaire, and an under-
representation of younger age groups (18–25 years) who traditionally are difficult to recruit 
for self-completion surveys. 
 
Measures taken from this survey have already been described in Ahmed and Braithwaite 
(2004), and hence, will not be reported in this paper. However, a brief description is 
provided of the two key variables of interest: (a) carrying a HECS debt, and (b) tax 
evasion.  
 
(a) To determine whether respondents were carrying a HECS loan, they were asked a 
single question: ‘Do you pay HECS for yourself?’ - 8% replied that they were.  
(b) Tax evasion was measured by asking questions on under-reporting income, 
engaging in the cash economy, and exaggerating deductions. 
 
Scores on the three evasion measures correlated positively with each other, ranging from 
0.11 (p < 0.001) to 0.35 (p < 0.001). Following Braithwaite (2003), they were combined 
into one composite tax evasion measure.  
 
 
 
                                                           
3 Details of the methodology of the survey are available in Mearns and Braithwaite (2001). 
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Graduates’ Hopes, Visions and Actions (GHVA) survey 
 
The second set of data used in this paper was collected from 447 Australian graduates who 
completed the GHVA survey (Ahmed, 2000b; for a detail description of the survey and its 
responses, see Ahmed, 2004). Selection was confined to graduates whose degrees were 
conferred in either 1998 or 1999, since they were expected to have become employed by 
the time the survey was mailed out. The sample was stratified in terms of students 
graduating from each discipline in two universities in the Australian Capital Territory.  
 
Of the 1500 questionnaires distributed, 447 were returned after several reminders, giving a 
response rate of 33% (after excluding undelivered questionnaires from the base). This 
response rate is comparable with rates reported for other tax-based surveys (Braithwaite, 
2001; Pope et al., 1993; Kirchler, 1999; Wallschutzky, 1996; Webley et al., 2002).  
 
Details about the measures taken from the GHVA survey have been described elsewhere 
(Ahmed, 2004). The two key variables – carrying a HECS debt and tax evasion – are 
described below.  
 
Graduates were asked whether they carry any HECS debt: ‘Do you have a HECS debt?’ 
(yes = 1, no = 2; reverse coded for analyses). Of the total sample, 65% had a HECS debt 
and 35% had paid their tuition fees upfront.  
 
Three measures were used to develop the behavioural index of tax evasion. To form the 
index of tax evasion, respondents were grouped as evaders if they had evaded tax in any 
one of the following ways: 
 
 ‘How much of your income in the 1999–2000 financial year did you get paid in 
untaxed cash?’ (that is, notes and coins rather than cheque or directly deposited into a 
bank account) (less than 5% = 1, 5–20% = 2, 20–50% = 3, more than 50% = 4, did not 
get paid any untaxed cash = 5); 
 ‘How much of your untaxed cash income did you declare on your 1999–2000 income 
tax return?’ (none = 1 through all = 10);  
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 ‘As far as you know, did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in your 
1999–2000 income tax return?’ ( a lot = 1, quite a lot = 2, somewhat = 3, a little = 4, 
not at all = 5);  
 ‘As far as you know, did you report all the money you earned in your 1999–2000 
income tax return?’ (yes = 1, no = 2). 
 
Respondents who indicated that they were totally compliant on all three indicators were 
assigned to the non-evader group. Thus, tax evasion was scored as 1 if the evader was non-
compliant on at least one indicator and 0 if compliant on all three indicators. This 
dichotomous index differs from the more refined, graduated index used in the CHFA 
survey. The reason is that new graduates are just entering the workforce and are relatively 
inexperienced with the tax system, possibly with fewer options for evasion. The data 
showed that the new graduates in this sample were less likely to be engaged in any more 
than one of these ways of evading tax. 
 
Findings 
 
Using the CHFA database, a Pearson product-moment correlational analysis was 
conducted to examine the relationship between carrying a HECS debt and cheating on tax. 
Carrying a HECS debt was positively and significantly related to tax evasion (r = 0.13; p < 
0.001). This means that citizens who have a HECS liability are more likely to engage in tax 
evasion, characterised by under-reporting income, over-claiming deductions, and engaging 
in the cash economy.  
 
Analysis with the GHVA survey, which contains a homogeneous sample of graduates, 
produced an identical result. The finding confirms that carrying a HECS debt poses a 
compliance problem for tax authorities. The Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient was 0.16 (p < 0.001).  
 
In a further analysis using an OLS regression with the CHFA database, carrying a HECS 
debt remained a positive and significant predictor of tax evasion after a number of other 
variables were taken into account. Briefly, the findings showed that tax evasion was more 
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likely among those who earned less income, believed there was a lower probability of 
being caught and did not fear the consequences of being caught (perceived deterrence), 
distanced themselves from an honest taxpaying ethic (moral obligation), were inclined to 
displace shame (blamed the Tax Office for any tax compliance problems), and did not 
believe that the Tax Office could be regarded as trustworthy in the future. Having a HECS 
debt increased tax non-compliance further, above and beyond these effects. 
 
While HECS debt seemed to be working on tax compliance independently of the other 
variables, interaction effects were observed between (a) having a HECS debt and 
confidence in the Tax Office; and (b) having a HECS debt and income. Citizens with a 
HECS debt were notably less willing to comply if they had lost confidence in their debt 
collector (that is, the Tax Office). Confidence in the Tax Office was assessed in terms of 
whether it had previously behaved in accordance with citizens’ expectations. Confidence 
or trustworthiness, therefore, seems to be an important precondition for increasing tax 
compliance among those who are yet to repay their HECS loan to the government. When 
trust or confidence does not exist, HECS debtors are more likely to practice tax evasion. 
 
The second circumstance making tax evasion more likely was low personal income. Tax 
evasion was greater among those citizens who were carrying a HECS debt and were living 
on a low income. The most likely interpretation of this finding is that cheating on tax may 
be one way of reducing financial burden. A recent parliamentary report has recognised 
unacceptable levels of financial hardship among Australians, particularly those on lower 
incomes (The Senate, Parliament of Australia 2004).4  
 
The role played by income in tax evasion, however, proved to be more complicated when 
the graduate data set was examined. The above findings emerged from a sample of the 
general population (of whom HECS debtors and university graduates made up but a small 
part). When the sample was restricted to recent university graduates (GHVA database), a 
different finding emerged. In ordinary least squares regression analysis, income was not a 
significant predictor of tax evasion among graduates. After a number of avenues were 
                                                           
4 The Senate Inquiry found that 21% of Australians were surviving on less than $400 per week. The 
minimum wage is $431. 
 9
explored to find an explanation of the findings, attention focused on the absence of a linear 
relationship in the data between income and tax evasion. For the graduate sample, the 
middle-income earners (with an annual income between AUD$30 000 and AUD$50 000) 
were the most non-compliant. A possible explanation is that among the graduate 
population, the group with most need for disposable income is the middle income group. 
They are ambitious for acquiring the capital they need to buy a car, a house, start a family 
and so on. Those on a lower salary may see themselves as still struggling to find their feet, 
holding lower aspirations, with some not yet required to pay back their HECS debt. 
Presumably, those on a higher salary can meet their aspirations as well as pay their HECS 
debt.  
 
When attention turns away from the graduates and toward the general population sample, it 
is likely that the group in most need of disposable income changes accordingly. Those 
struggling to make ends meet are less likely to be middle income earners and more likely 
to be lower income earners. It is of note that past studies (for a review, see Richardson & 
Sawyer, 2001) have produced conflicting results on the link between income and tax 
evasion. In light of the findings reported here, further study is warranted to determine 
whether income bears different meaning at different stages of the life cycle, and therefore 
differentially impacts on tax compliance. 
 
The non-linear relationship between income and tax evasion was illustrated using a 
Decision Tree Analysis5 which confirmed that tax evasion among graduates was 
concentrated among those who earned between AUD$30 000 and AUD$50 000 a year. To 
gain further insight into this result, another tree analysis was performed in which age was 
included (see Figure 1). Citizens in their late 20s who fell in the above income range and 
were carrying a HECS debt were more likely to cheat on tax.6 Such findings can be 
explained by the fact that Australian citizens in their late 20s and early 30s are likely to be 
planning their futures in terms of getting married, starting a family and/or owning a home 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001). It therefore seems plausible to postulate that life 
                                                           
5 A Decision Tree Analysis is a graphic representation of a procedure for classifying or evaluating a variable 
of interest against one or more other variables. In the current case, we wanted to show the nodes for personal 
income to determine the extent to which tax evasion occurs within those nodes.  
6 One cautionary note is that only 15 cases were in this terminal node of tax evasion. 
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stage is a factor affecting capacity or willingness to meet tax obligations. Of particular 
interest in these findings was that while tax evasion was far more prevalent among those 
carrying the debt, an identical pattern was evident among those who paid upfront. As 
Figure 1 reveals, tax evasion was also common (although to a lesser extent) among 
graduates who had already finished payments to HECS, and who were in their late 20s and 
early 30s with earnings in the mid-range of AUD$30 000 to AUD$50 000. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A Decision Tree Analysis for tax evasion using HECS debt, income and age 
as classifying variables  
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III. AUSTRALIAN HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY: SOCIAL DEMANDS AND 
POLITICAL RESPONSES 
 
Section II has demonstrated that bearing a HECS debt was associated with tax non-
compliance. But the Decision tree analysis demonstrated that carrying a HECS debt was 
not the only consideration affecting tax compliance among new graduates. 
Demographically, people in their late 20s in the income range of AUD$30 000 to 
AUD$50 000 were more likely to cheat on tax regardless of their HECS situation. This 
suggests that carrying a loan or paying it off upfront may be less important than the sheer 
size of the financial investment that is made by individuals to obtain a tertiary degree. This 
raises the question of whether HECS policy, designed to create opportunity for those who 
are more marginalised in terms of their likely participation in tertiary education, actually is 
delivering intended support.  
 
In order to examine this question, Section III compares the two groups of graduates (those 
who had paid HECS upfront and those who still had a HECS debt) on a broader range of 
variables, including additional socio-demographic variables and an array of perceptions 
and attitudes towards HECS and taxation.  
 
Database 
 
The analyses presented in this section are based on the GHVA survey dataset. A detail 
account of the variables used in this section can be found in Ahmed (2004). 
 
Findings at the bivariate level 
 
A series of independent t-tests was conducted to explore differences between the two 
groups of graduates.  
 
Findings in respect of socio-demographic variables indicated that graduates carrying a 
HECS debt tended to be (a) young women from less affluent backgrounds, (b) enrolled in a 
full-time study predominantly doing combined degrees (for example, law and arts, 
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economics and computer science), and understandably, (c) relatively new in the 
employment market. 
 
Another important finding was that graduates who had yet to repay the debt to the 
government were less satisfied with the quality of their university education. Significantly, 
they expressed more dissatisfaction about the quality of the professional skills that they 
had acquired, which is crucial to their employment prospects. 
 
Graduates’ responses also reflected their adverse attitudes towards HECS as a social 
policy. Findings revealed that graduates who carried a HECS debt were more likely, than 
those who did not, to regard HECS as unfair. Not surprisingly, therefore, they felt less of 
an internalised obligation to repay the loan (HECS morale), and expressed less shame and 
remorse if caught for non-payment. Further analyses were carried out of group differences 
in taxpaying behaviour. Consistent with the negativity to government reflected in the 
above findings, cheating on tax was found to be more common among those who were 
carrying a HECS debt. 
 
 
Table 1: Standardised Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients, Wilk’s Lambda 
and F-values with their level of significance from a Discriminant Function Analysis 
 
 
Predictor variables 
Standardised 
Canonical 
Discriminant 
Function 
Coefficients 
 
Wilk’s 
Lambda 
 
F value 
with 
significance 
Modes of study (full-time vs part-time) 0.46 0.76 102.68***
Perceived deterrence -0.37 0.72 63.23***
Age 0.36 0.68 50.44***
Length of working years 0.36 0.66 42.16***
Perception of HECS as an unfair scheme -0.32 0.64 36.91***
Shame acknowledgment 0.25 0.63 31.87***
Gender -0.21 0.62 28.28***
Tax evasion -0.19 0.61 25.51***
Canonical R 0.62   
Eigenvalue 0.64   
Chi-Square 159.45***   
*** p < 0.001 
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In the next stage, a discriminant function analysis was used to determine which of the 
above variables were the most important in discriminating between the two groups. Once 
we know about these variables, a better understanding of how HECS policy connected with 
graduates’ perceptions of taxpaying responsibility should be possible. Only variables that 
at the bivariate level significantly differentiated those carrying a HECS debt from those not 
carrying a HECS debt were used in the discriminant analysis (see Table 1).  
 
Discriminant function analysis 
 
As is evident from Table 1, eight variables made significant contributions to the 
discriminant analysis in differentiating the two groups of graduates. A total of 85% of the 
graduates carrying a HECS debt and 74% of the graduates who paid upfront were correctly 
placed in their respective group, which is well above the 50% chance of correct 
classification. The emerged discriminant function accounted for 64% of the total variance 
(Wilk’s Lambda = 0.61, Canonical correlation = 0.62, Chi-square = 159.45, p < 0.001) (see 
Table 1). The eigenvalue, chi-square, and Wilk’s Lambda suggest that a considerable 
amount of discriminatory information is accounted for by the eight discriminatory 
variables.  
 
Overall, the significant variables can be grouped in two categories: (1) socio-demographic 
and (2) social-psychological. Among the socio-demographic variables were: (1) age (M = 
31), (2) gender, (3) full-time/part-time enrolment, and (4) length of employment. The 
pattern of findings suggests that graduates carrying the debt tended to be young women 
who were enrolled in full-time studies. Their length of employment experience was less 
than that of the other group, who paid upfront. Put simply, HECS debt was more common 
among citizens who traditionally have been viewed as more marginalised and who were 
relatively new to the labour market.  
 
The analysis also revealed that four social-psychological variables were critical to 
understanding the psychology of HECS loan beneficiaries. Apart from being more likely to 
evade tax, they were: (1) more fearful of deterrent action by the tax authority for non-
payment of HECS, (2) more likely to perceive HECS as an unfair scheme, and (3) less 
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likely to feel shame or guilt about non-payment. At first glance, it seems paradoxical that 
graduates carrying a HECS debt perceived deterrence as a likely outcome of non-payment 
of the debt, and at the same time shruged off their feelings of shame for non-payment. This 
can be explained through graduates’ belief that HECS is an unfair policy, which justifies 
the lack of shame and remorse for non-payment despite their fear of deterrence (Ahmed, 
2000a). Possibly the unfair policy neutralises shame feelings (Sykes & Matza, 1957; 
Thurman, St. John & Riggs, 1984) However, more than this seems to be happening. 
Graduates seem to be flouting the law not only in relation to HECS but in relation to other 
laws as well (Nadler, 2002). What is not clearly understood is the path that leads graduates 
to tax evasion. We endeavour to gain some insight into this issue in the next section.  
 
IV. THE NEED FOR AN EMOTIONALLY INTELLIGENT POLICY TO DETER 
TAX EVASION 
 
The main findings that emerged from Section III are fourfold. First, there is overall support 
for the equity argument for implementing HECS policy in that the more marginalised take 
out a loan. Second, there is dissatisfaction with HECS policy among the group carrying a 
HECS debt. Third, those with a HECS debt feel less shame and remorse for not repaying 
the HECS loan in spite of fear of the tax authorities’ deterrence measures. Finally, Section 
I and Section II each show that carrying a HECS debt is linked with tax evasion. 
 
The above findings raised the possibility that psychological variables may have been 
responsible for undermining the legitimacy of the tax system in the eyes of graduates. The 
reasoning behind this speculation is as follows: HECS is undertaken by students to pursue 
a university education for a better future with better employment status. This is akin to a 
‘psychological contract’ between the government and students. When students finish their 
education they search for employment to which they believe they are entitled and prepare 
to repay the HECS loan. If they feel dissatisfied with the quality of the university education 
they received, they regard the outcome as a violation of the ‘psychological contract’. It 
may well be the case that such students believe that they have been ‘short-changed’ by the 
government, and that cheating on tax is the best possible way to get back at the 
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government. Tax cheating by graduates, therefore, is in the nature of retaliation against the 
debt collector. 
 
In order to cast new light on the psychological processes leading to tax evasion by 
graduates, a path analytical approach was used. The path analysis included eight variables 
that were derived from Sections II and III. These are: HECS debt, policy discontent, 
university course satisfaction, shame management variables (shame acknowledgment, 
shame displacement, and shame avoidance over not repaying HECS debt), dissociation 
from the tax system, and tax evasion.  
 
Database 
 
The analyses presented in this section are again based on the GHVA survey dataset. A 
detailed description of the variables used in this section can be found in Ahmed (2004). 
 
Briefly, HECS debt represents whether a respondent has a loan for his or her higher 
education through HECS. Policy discontent represents dissatisfaction with HECS as a 
government policy to fund higher education. University course satisfaction represents the 
degree to which graduates feel satisfied with their investment in higher education. It was 
operationalised as graduates’ satisfaction with what they received, specifically (a) the 
quality of teaching, (b) skill acquisition, and (c) professional development. 
 
Three shame management variables were used: Shame acknowledgment refers to admitting 
shame and remorse should one be caught for non-payment of a HECS loan, shame 
displacement refers to feeling angry at the tax authority should such an event occur, and 
shame avoidance refers to a lack of shame for being challenged by the authority. 
 
Dissociation is understood as a socially distant posture that enables citizens to cut 
themselves off from the demands of the tax authority and successfully challenge the 
authority (for details, see Braithwaite, 2003). Finally, tax evasion is an index representing 
whether one has or has not cheated on tax in relation to either under-reporting income or 
exaggerating deductions. 
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Findings 
 
Through correlational analyses, it was found that perceived policy discontent and course 
dissatisfaction reduced shame acknowledgment but increased shame displacement and 
shame avoidance. Low shame acknowledgment and high shame displacement was 
significantly related to dissociation; and dissociation was positively related to tax evasion. 
Graduates who were not satisfied with their university degree were more likely to 
dissociate from the Tax Office and were more likely to engage in tax evasion. The last 
significant correlation among the eight variables showed that bearing a HECS debt was 
positively linked with tax evasion, defined as over-claiming deductions or not declaring 
untaxed income.  
 
Next, a path analysis took account of the inter-relationships among the same eight 
variables to try to understand how they were connected and leading to tax evasion. 
Understanding what these relationships mean at the bivariate level is impossible because of 
their interrelations. The findings (see Figure 2) uncovered a number of different pathways 
to tax evasion for Australian graduates which involved not only their experiences with 
HECS but also their experiences of university education, regardless of whether they paid 
their HECS upfront or as a loan.  
 
First, from Figure 2, a direct link was found between carrying a HECS debt and cheating 
on one’s tax return. Such a relationship was independent of the graduates’ personal income 
or family income.  
 
Second, dissatisfaction with university courses resulted in a greater inclination to cheat on 
tax, regardless of whether or not one carried a HECS debt. Such dissatisfaction also had an 
indirect effect on tax evasion via reduced levels of shame and remorse and higher levels of 
displaced anger, leading to dissociation from feeling any obligation to pay one’s tax. 
 
Third, discontent in relation to HECS policy also revealed an indirect pathway to tax 
evasion. Those who perceived HECS as being an unfair scheme showed low shame  
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acknowledgment and high shame displacement which, in turn, was associated with 
distancing oneself from the tax system. Once they had disavowed any sense of obligation 
to pay taxes by shrugging off feelings of shame, they were dissociated from the system and 
likely to engage in tax evasion. 
 
These results underscore the proposition that channels to tax evasion are emotional, 
cognitive and social – as well as economic. It is emotional because shame management 
(acknowledgment and displacement) played a major mediating role in affecting tax 
evasion. It is social because discontent with HECS policy and university education seemed 
to be responsible for eliciting the forms of shame management that are linked with tax 
evasion. The acts of evasion have a cognitive base because citizens knowingly distanced 
themselves from their debt collector and disobeyed tax law. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper provides evidence about the circumstances under which citizens carrying a 
HECS loan do not comply with their tax obligations. Findings obtained from two 
independent surveys demonstrate that having a HECS debt carries a risk of tax evasion 
among Australian graduates. This in itself is an important finding for those contemplating 
expansion of the functions of a tax authority beyond tax collection. Equally important is 
the finding that evaluation of government funding and performance in one area (tertiary 
education) influences relationships with other parts of government (the tax authority). Tax 
evasion among graduates is not only a result of bearing the HECS loan, but also of the 
psychology of being poorly treated in relation to one’s tertiary experience, by the 
university and by the government that funds the universities.  
 
HECS was initiated to ensure merit-based entry to university education irrespective of 
Australian citizen’s socio-economic background. Our analyses suggest that HECS policy 
probably has achieved its overall objectives in promoting accessibility of higher education 
to marginalised Australians. But at the same time it appears to have had some unforeseen 
and unintended adverse consequences over the last two decades. It seems to have provided 
justification for breaking the law through evading tax. 
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Apart from legal ramifications surrounding tax, there are economic ramifications as well. 
In Australia, twenty percent of HECS debt was referred to as ‘HECS doubtful debt’ and 
estimated at A$2.8 billion in 2004. Other nations have reported similar consequences. For 
example, New Zealand Inland Revenue has reported substantial losses in unpaid student 
loans (Annual Report, Student Loan Scheme, 2003). More alarming is the fact that in the 
United Kingdom in 2003, three times more students than in 2002 declared bankruptcy in 
order to have their student loans discharged (BBC News, 2 March 2004).  
 
Bearing a HECS liability has economic consequences through tax losses as well. In the 
regression analysis reported in Section 1, the effect size associated with carrying a HECS 
debt was 14.89%. This means that not owing a HECS debt could reduce tax evasion by 
14.89%, which raises the question of whether it is not more economically sound to have 
tuition fees publicly funded by tax dollars in the first place (Ahmed & Braithwaite, 
submitted; Yu, Hume, Ingleson, & McConkey, 2002).  
 
The HECS policy has changed the frame for higher education in Australia. It has changed 
from being an entitlement system to a contractual, user-pays system. Associated with this 
new frame is a dynamic exchange of obligations and expectations in an on-going 
relationship. This ‘psychological contract’ is complex, changeable, individualistic, and 
therefore unpredictable. By demonstrating that a variety of factors including course 
dissatisfaction, carrying a HECS debt, and opposing HECS policy can weaken resolve to 
pay one’s tax, this study has provided insight into the level of bargaining between citizens 
and the state that might be expected in the future. 
  
HECS policy has created problems for government and law enforcement agencies because 
its designers have disregarded the importance of legitimacy for winning compliance. 
Recently, it has been proposed that the tax system can also be used to collect fines for a 
wide variety of offences, ranging from traffic infringements to more serious criminal 
offences (see Chapman, Freiberg, Quiggin & Tait, 2004). Such as an extension of the Tax 
Office’s responsibilities may only add to existing problems. The proposed Fine 
Enforcement Collection Scheme (FECS) seems as flawed by its shortcomings in not 
recognising the psychological factors at work in compliance, as by its short-sightedness in 
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not recognising the difficulties of reversing a process that slowly undermines tax system 
legitimacy. 
 
In adopting HECS policy, policy makers seem to have dissociated its economic credentials 
from the social fabric in which it is embedded. Most of the economic elements, like 
payment, administration costs, and collection costs, have been considered outside their 
social, emotional and psychological contexts. Hence, the social, emotional and 
psychological costs of HECS policy have been largely ignored and not understood.  
 
Thus, an argument should be made for the establishment of emotionally intelligent policy 
that is not only economically sound but also responsive to citizens’ emotions and 
motivations. Such responsiveness is necessary for ethical and effective regulation, and to 
give government legitimacy and trustworthiness in the eyes of citizens. Without 
legitimacy, trustworthiness and the social conscience it generates, governments will have 
to rely on tax authorities becoming more coercive in order to implement and administer 
their policies. 
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